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Implementation of Indirect Monetary Control in Nigeria:
Problems and Prospects *
F.O. Oresotu..
The paper discusses the advantages and disadvantages, pre-conditions, instruments
and issues in indirect approach to monetary and aedit control. Among the
preconditions stated are the ability of the Central Bank to farmulate au appropriate
monetary programme to which gcruermnent must give support and co-op1..'rntion to the
Central Bank in its execution. The importance of compelitive money and short-tenn
securities markets to serve as medium for transmitting monetary policy action to the
productive sectors of the economy is also stressed. This will facilitate the functioning
of an efficient transmission medumism for the allocation offinancial resources among
competing needs. 11ie relevance of a machinery for tlie regular su7rply of ur1-to-date
data on the operations of the finan cial institutions to pl!Tmit the supervisory agencies
and other operators to take timely decisions is also sfressed. TT1e principal instruments
of the indirect arrproach to monetary control comprise mainly cash reserve
requirement, the discount rate meclumism, and open market opt.>rations. Among the
issues discussed on the market-b,1sed approach are problems of programme
implementation, control of monetary aggregates and the international aspects. The
modalities for the implementation of indirect approach to monetary and cr.:dit control
in Nigeria are also discussed. Prol,/ems for immediate introduction of tlte new
technique are listed as government {rSCill deficit financing and excess liquidity;
harmonization of fiscal and monetary policies, insolvent banks, non-liank financial
institutions, inadequate money market activities, w eak banking supervision,
inadequacy of regular and reliable sltitistic,il data as well as the necd to train tlie CBN
stuff that will handle the introduction of the new ted111ique. 111e cff01·ts of the CBN
in addressing these problems ure btcd in the paper. The prospects for the successful
implementation of indirect approach to monetary managcmc11t are presented as being
inextricably amnectcd with the ability ofgovernment to minimize fiscal deficit, reduce
its dependence on the CBN, and co--ordinute monetary and fisml policies. The
monetary authorities should also l,e able to foster and sustain confidence in the
financial system. Another imperative factor in the ,,,.aspect for the new techni,7ue is
discipline on the 11art of both government and banks.

Monetary policy is a package of actions designed to manage the growth of money
supply during a period to its optimal target. When successful, the level of money
A ver:sion of this paper was presented al a work.s hop organized by the Research Department, Central Birnk.
of Nigeria, for its Senior and Principal Economists at the CBN Training Centre on October 20, 1993.
•• Mr. F.O. Oresotu is a Deputy Director, Research Department, Central Bank of Nigeria.
•
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becomes compatible with the rates of growths of output, inflation, and interest rates.
At such a level, money plays the role of an efficient lubricant of the wheel of economic
activities; money will then not constitute a nuisance to the extend that its supply is
too much, or frustrate business intentions to the extent that its supply is too little. The
strategy of monetary control maybe classified into two: direct and indirect. The direct
approach to monetary control comprises the fixing of quantitative ceiling on banks'
credit expansion and taking actions to ensure banks compliance. The indirect
approach involves the use of market-based instrumenl5 to effect changes in the
availability and cost of credit. For a Jong time since political independence the
monetary authorities in Nigeria relied on the direct approach, prescribing credit
ceilings and administratively fixing interest rates.
The efforts to deregulate all sectors of the Nigerian economy through the Structural
Adjustffi€nt Programme (SAP) introduced in 1986 have considerably influenced
developments in the financial sector. The dereeulation of the financial sector is
intended to create a suitable environment for the introduction of the indirect
technique of monetary and credit management. Initial reform efforl5 comprised
simplification of the format for sectoral credit allocation, deregulation of bank deposit
and lending rates, introduction of an auction system for dealing in treasury
instruments, and liberalization of procedures for establishing new banks. In its 1991
budget announcement, the Federal Government indicated that the technique of
monetary management would shift to the use of indirect monetary policy
instruments during the year. However, government did recognize the existence of
many problems which should first be tackled before the introduction of the new
approach. While attempts have been made to solve many of the problems, some of
them are still outstanding.
During the course of 1992, it became clear that in spite of a number of unresolved
issues, it was neither realistic nor practicable to completely remove all identified
constraints before the shift to indirect control is effected . Furthermore, the prolonged
use of direct controls had engendered inefficiencies and distortions in the financial
system, which in turn continued to pose major problems for monetary and credit
policy implementation. Further delay in introducing indirect controls would only
aggravate these problems. Consequently, in August, 1992, the CBN embarked on a
phased approach to the use of indirect controls. Effective 1st September, 1992, in
pursuit of the new monetary policy framework, the ceiling imposed on individual
bank's credit growth was re1;1oved for banks which met some specified performance
criteria se t by the CBN. The criteria comprised specified cash reserve and liquidity
ratio, prudential guidelines, statutory minimum paid-up capital requirement, capital
adequacy ratio, and sound management. The meeting of the requirement was also
to determine banks' eligibility for participation in the official foreign exchange
market. Monetary policy proposals for 1993 were based on the broad framework of
the new market-based indirect approach to monetary and credit control anchored on
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Open Market Operations (OMO) and augmented by cash reserve requirements,
liquidity ratio and discount window operations. The shift to the indirect approach
reached an advanced stage in June, 1993, when OMO was introduced following the
advent of one discount house which was joined in rapid succession by two other
discount houses.
The main objective of this paper is to discuss the problems and prospects of
successful implementation of indirect approach to monetary and credit controls in
Nigeria. For ease of presentation, the paper is divided into five parts. Part I is devoted
to the definition, preconditions, instruments and issues in indirect approach to
monetary control. Part II discusses the modalities for indirect approach to monetary
and credit control in Nigeria. The problems of the successful implementation of
indirect monetary control in Nigeria are highlighted in Part III while Part IV contains
a status report on the implementation of the new approach in Nigeria. The paper
ends in Part V, which focuses on the prospects of minimizing the effects of the
problems outstanding in order to derive the advantages of the new approach to
monetary management.

I. INDIRECT MONETARY CONTROL: DEFINITION,
ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES, PRECONDITIONS,
INSTRUMENTS AND ISSUES
Indirect a pproach to monetary control involves the use of reserve requirements, Open
Market Operations, discount rate, etc., in the financial markets to control the cost and
availability of credit. It is thus different from the direct approach whereby credit
control is directly achieved through the imposition of credit ceilings on banks by the
monetary authorities without going through the financial markets. Under the regime
of indirect approach to monetary control, the permissible aggregate credit would
continue to be determined by the Central Bank but mainly for monitoring purposes.
The Central Bank will monitor the movement of its monetary base, defined as the
sum of its credit to government and the private sectors, net foreign assets and othe r
assets (net). The components of the monetary base represent sources of creation of
the base while the monetary base is held by banks and non-bank.., as reserves and
currency outside banks, respectively. The feasibility of controlling the monetary base
hinges on the principle that credit control can be achieved by controlling the
monetary base.
1.1

Advantages and Disadvantages of Indirect Monetary Control

The advantages in the proposed technique of monetary management include the ease
with which appropriate changes could be made in the instruments used for achieving
monetary policy objectives and the possible improvement in' the efficiency of the
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financial system that could be derived from the underlying flexibility of its operations. For example, reserve requirements are easy to administer as bank reserves held
at the Central Bank could be known on a daily basis. Similarly, as a substantial part
of bank reserves are held with the Central Bank, such cash positions are easily
ascertainable and fairly quickly for an assessment of the state of banking system
liquidity and poter.1tiality for credit creation. Also, unlike credit ceilings, the flexible
nature of Open Market Operations renders it easily adaptable to changes as situation
demands. In addition, reserve requirements and Open Market Operations do not
interfere with competition among banks. Moreover, the institutional arrangements
required for the operation of the r.1ew system promote greater efficiency in the use of
the financial system's resources.
However, the use of cash requirements entails withdrawal of reserves from banks.
This may impose a cost on the economy. The withdrawal of bank reserves may also
discourage deposit mobilization as the ratio rises. Higher values of reserve
requirements could lead to higher lending rates. Also, the creation of new
instruments by the Central Bank for purposes of Open Market Operations imposes
a cost on the monetary authorities. In the alternative, when OMO is conducted in
government debt instruments, the cost of government debt is left to vary according
to market rates. This invariably leads to higher cost of government domestic debt.
I.2

Preconditions

The conduct of monetary policy through the indirect approach to monetary control
requires some prerequisites. There is the need to have appropriate institutional
arrangement required for effective operations in short-term securities market-; as well
as adequate and capable Central Bank staff capacity that could prepare practicable
monetary programme. Other prerequisites include availability of reliable data on the
activities of the financial system and the existence of confidence of economic agents
in the system.
The Central Bank and the government should be able to fashion out a financial
programme that takes account of the public sector borrowing requirement (PSBR)
and which is consistent with realistic objectives of growth of aggregate demand,
inflation, interest rates and exchange rate. Such a programme will enable the Central
Bank to determine the scope of feasible financial accommodation the banking system
could give the government and the credit requirements of the private sector. Without
the exp1icit co-operation of the fiscal authorities it is not possible for the Central Bank
to achieve an acceptable nominal income path. The preparation or revision of a
monetary programme usually begins with a review of the recent performance of the
economy, taking into account the current inflation rate, factors indicating the state of
pressures on the general level of prices, and prospect-; for the exchange rate and
balance of payment'-. The review will also evaluate the growth of output relative to
its medium-term potential. These reviews will lead to decisions as to the direction
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of the growth of nominal demand.
The effective control of the monetary base by the Central Bank requires appropriate
legal and regulatory powers and the ability to enforce regulations. There must also
be a competitive inter-bank market as well as a market for short-term securities and
the relevant institutions for the trading of instruments. Bank supervision must be
sufficiently strong to avoid major financial failures. There must be an effective
transmission mechanism for monetary policy which should be based on active
competition among operators in the financial markets.
The Central Bank and government must make effort to ensure confidence in the
financial system. The existence of strong parallel markets, financial
dis-intermediation, low debtor morality, and persistent inflation is symptomatic of a
general loss of confidence in the integrity of the local financial instruments and
markets. The extent of such markets may reduce if government pursues stable
macroeconomic policies such as sustained reduction in deficit financing.
There must be information system for providing timely data on bank reserves,
government activities, and money market conditions.
1.3

Principal Instruments of Indirect Approach to Credit Controls

The principal instruments of indirect credit control are Cash Reserves Requirements
(CRR}, Open Market Operations (OMO}, and the Discount Rate. Other instruments,
which are not emphasized in the following discussions comprise the use of government deposits, Central Bank refinancing of designated loans, special deposits for
Central Bank customers, etc. As long as these are used as market-based measures for
controlling liquidity they are recognized as indirect control meas ures .
l.3.1 Cash Reserve Requirement

Cash reserve requirement is a monetary policy instrument that obliges banks to hold
a specified proportion of their deposit liabilities as cash deposits with the Central
Bank. The higher the percentage of bank reserves that is stipulated as legal cash
reserve requirement the lower the proportion of the banks' funds that is available as
backing for credit expansion, thus reducing the capacity to create money. On the other
hand, a reduction in the reserve requirement increases the capacity of banks to create
credit. Reserve requirements are particularly effective for sterilizing excess liquidity
in the bankingsystem but are less efficient for the day-to-day management of bank
liquidity, for which Open Market Oper:itions are much more efficient.
I.3.2 Open Market Opt-Tations

Open Market Operations (OMO) are powerful and flexible monetary policy tools
available to a Central Bank under a free market system. The operations are coordinated with discount window and reserve requirement policies to achieve the
desired monetary and credit t:irget. Open Market Operations are used to regulate
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banks' cash reserves and money creation through the purchase and/ or sale of
securities by the Central Bank. The securities and bills traded by the Central Bank are
not usually limited to government issues. They are also not limited in maturiti~s
although actua I practice varies from country to country and over time. The effects of
OMO on bank liquidity are the same as those of reserve requirements but with the
additional advantage that Open Market Operations can be used for the day-to-day
fine-tuning of bank reserves in the desired direction. For example, when the Central
Bank sells papers in the market, the liquidity (excess reserves) of the banking system
declines, thereby limiting the capacity of the banking system to extend credit and
expand money supply. Conversely, when the Central Bank makes purchases, the
liquidity of the system increases and the ability to expand credit is enhanced. Thus,
the daily operations of the Central Bank in this regard are guided by the desire to
produce a certain degree of ease or tightness in money supply, depending on the
desired monetary and credit targets. Through these activities, the Central Bank
directly changes the cash reserves of banks and indirectly induces banks to change
interest rates, thereby leading to changes in the costs and availability of credit and,
ultimately, money supply.
1.3.3 The Discount Rate: Mechanism•

This is the interest rate charged by the Central Bank on its loans. The rate is set to
reflect the banking and credit conditions available in the market. Discount rates are
adjusted from time to time in the light of changing market conditions and to
complement OMO and the thrust of monetary policy generally. A discount rate that
is low relative to market rates makes it more likely that institutions will come to the
window. Consequently, depository institutions (banks) will tend to increase their
borrowing when market interest rates rise relative to the discount rate, and to curtail
borrowing when market rates fall.
Adjustment in discount rate is generally effected as market interest rates and the
level of borrowing change with a view to controlling the volume and profitability of
the borrowing institutions. To the extent that changes in discount rates are made
judgementally rather than automatically and may lag behind changes in market rates
to a degree, the discount rate is not market determined.
In response to a given discount rate, changes in the level of borrowing may simply
reflect temporary changes in the borrower's response to transitory demands for
money and credit. Such changes might also keep money and credit from deviating
substantially from targets by providing or absorbing reserves when the demand for
excess reserves of the amount of required reserves needed to support a given level
of deposits has changed unexpectedly. Under these conditions1 an adjustment in the
•

It should be stated here that although the CBN charges banks on ove-rdrawn accounts, the Bank. does not
operate a discountwindow from which banks could borrow. However, the discount houses which also enjoy
disrounling facilities with the CBN undertake discounting operations for banks.
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discount rate would needlessly exacerbate money market pressures and could be
counter-productive.
However, an adjustment in the discount rate may be desirable to reinforce Open
Market Operations when a change in the level of borrowing is contributing to
sustained growth in money and credit relative to policy targets. For instance, in a
period of money growth a rise in discount rate would reduce incentives to borrow
from the Central Bank and help to accelerate portfolio adjustments in depository
institutions towards reduced credit expansion and money. Thus, a rise in discount
rate could complement the effect of OMO on non-borrowed reserves.
The general response of the market rate to a change in discount rate will be larger
when the market views the adjustment as signalling a shift in the Central Bank's
evaluation of the underlying condition of the economy and of money and credit
demands. Changes in discount rate must be interpreted in the context of surrounding
economic and financial conditions and in the light of the way they complement other
policy actions. If a change in discount rate is anticipated it may not make appreciable
impact on market rates. This explains why timely actions are required for effecting
changes in discount rates before such changes are predicted by bank.<;.
1.4

Issues in Monetary Management Under Indirect Approach to Credit Control

In this section we discuss the transmission mechanism and how this is influenced by
the stability of the demand for monetary aggregates and the state of competition in
the financial system. AII things being equal, credit allocation by banks under a system
of indirect controls is to the highest risk-adjusted bidder. The level of interest rates is
determined by the interaction of the supply and demand for credit. The supply of
credit depends on the available reserves. Demand for credit reflect,; the risk and
expectations and prospects for investment as perceived by private borrowers. However, the demand by the public sector also affect<; the available credit to the private
sector.
T.4.1 Programme Implementation Problems

While the programme usually aims at target rates of output growth, inflation,
exchange and interest rates, developments during the programme period influence
the achievement of policy targets. Unexpected changes in demand for public sector
credit will affect the share of credit available to the private sector and, consequently,
the interest rates charged by banks on loans and advances to the sector. Other factors,
such as the state of liquidity and solvency of banks, especially the problem banks,
would affect interest rates. Also, unexpected developments, such as changes in
weather conditions, export and import prices, flows of aids and foreign investments,
play significant role in the achievement of programme targets. The quality and
timeliness of available data used in programme formulation and imple mentation also
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affect the outcome of programme implementation and achievements. Under a system
of indirect monetary controls the effects of these are most likely to manifest sharply
than under direct controls because prices are more sensitive under market conditions.
This is why programmes are usually reviewed periodically with a view to containing
the effect,:; of unanticipated developments on basic prices and balance of payments
under the market oriented strategy of monetary control.
1.4.2 Control of Monetary Aggregates

In order to implement the programme the Central Bank controls the supply of reserve
money through the use of the instruments already enumerated. It is believed that a
relationship exists between the money stock and the reserve money. Reserve money,
in this case, is defined as the sum of bank reserves (R) and currency outside banks
(Cp); and that this relationship is stable in the sense that the associated money
multiplier could be predicted fairly accurately. The simplest form of such a relationship is given by

M2 = (1 + c)/(r + c + e) • [R + Cpl
where c = currency to bank deposit ratio;
r = required reserves to bank deposit ratio;
e = excess reserves to bank deposit ratio.

............ (1)

The issues here are that the money multiplier depends mainly on three factors, and
any development in the factors would affect the stability of the money multiplier. A
component of the money supply is held as currency, the demand for which is
determined by the general public, based on their payment practices, liquidity
preference, the rate of inflation, expectations of exchange rate movements, and
opportunities for alternative financial investments. Second, banks must hold reserves
equal to a certain proportion of their deposits. The expansion of bank loans require
acquisition of additional reserves. Third, banks hold reserves above stipulated
requirements for prudential reasons. Variations in the money multiplier complicate
the task of control of monetary aggregates although availability of timely and
accurate data could enable a Central Bank to adjust its programme to offset the
adverse effects of undesirable changes.
Some factors affecting bank reserves cannot be controlled by the Central Bank. The
Central Bank cannot control the volume of currency outstanding although it can
influence how much is held through its policies. Also, while some policies may affect
the non-bank holdings of foreign exchanges reserves, the Central Bank does not
control government deposits although it can enter into agreement on its
management. Similarly, Central Banks that hold accounts for parastatals in the public
sector cannot control the flow of reserves arising through the operations of such
accounts unless specific policies are instituted for the achievement of such control.
Central Banks adopt a variety of techniques to affect changes in rese rves. By
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lending to or borrowing from banks, Central Banks could increase or reduce reserves.
However, for the purpose of achieving monetary stability, Central Banks usually
adopt lending arrangements which permit them to decide how much is to be lent.
Central Banks also use Open Market Operations to influence the volume of bank
reserves. The Central Bank may refrain from lending to government directly although
it could purchase government securities to the tune of its own needs only to adjust
its holdings of the securities. Central Bank could also refinance particular types of
loans with a view to putting reserves into the system. The use of government deposits
and discount window operations are also other ways of influencing bank reserves.
Some Central Banks manage bank reserves by selling their own debt obligations to
reduce reserves.
In countries where government fiscal deficits are financed by the Central Bank
reserve management may be difficult and problematic depending on the magnitude
and frequency of the deficit. Large and rising fiscal deficits will involve fiduciary
issues of the currency by the same magnitude. Bank deposits will also grow
correspondingly, swelling bank reserves and currency outside banks. The rapid
growth of reserve under this type of macroeconomic management reduces the
effectiveness of monetary policy.
I.4.3 The Role of the Money Market

For the effectiveness of indirect control an efficient, competitive money market is very
essential in order to permit banks to compete for a share of supply of reserves and
achieve desired structure of interest rates. As banks mobilize deposits and grant loans
and advances their daily positions will result in temporary surplus or deficit holdings. The existence of a well co-ordinated competitive money market will enable
banks in deficit to purchase reserves and those in surplus to dispose of their holdings,
making it possible for banks to expand loans and advances and operate on the foreign
exchange market without inhibition. A competitive money market provides equal
opportunity for all banks to buy or sell the standard instruments in these markets,
thereby establishing a standard cost of funds which will provide a uniform basis for
setting loans and deposit rates. Thus, the existence of broad markets in short-term
securities and inter-bank loans leads to more effective and active competition in the
deposit and loans market which may grow to form a solid foundation for the
development of financial market.
What is most important in the transmission of the effect of monetary policy to the
real sector of the economy is the interest rates prevailing in the loans and advances
market where interactions between lenders (banks and other financial institutions)
and borrowers (firms and individuals) take place. In sharing the credit among
individuals and firms banks are guided by their cost of funds and the prevailing
conditions in the market, including the demand situation and returns on other
activities competing for funds. Borrowers, on their part are influenced by the real
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margindl rates of return expected on investment opportunities avaiJable to them.
Competition among lenders and borrowers will lead to the determination of
risk-adjusted interest rates that would lead to an efficient allocation of the credit
among the private demand. The role of the market is therefore to serve as a medium
for these activities to occur. The more competitive the market is the more efficient the
structure of interest rates that will emerge.
Under a system of flexible interest rates, variations in the rates will occur partly
from non-monetary forces driving nominal expenditures such as changes in
government expenditures, investment demand, export earnings, consumption
expenditures, etc. Another source of variation in interest rates under a flexible regime
is a change in the demand for money as depicted by variations in the velocity of
money. Wide variations in interest rates usually have adverse economic and political
effects. For a system of indirect monetary controls to attain its objectives it should
therefore operate in such a way as to minimize inflation in interest rates.
The effectiveness of indirect approach to monetary and credit control depends on
the existence of a stable and relatively interest ela!>tic demand function for domestic
credit by the non-bank public. This is to allow the e ffect of a change in interest rates
on the demand for credit and, conseguently, on money supply to be predictable and
significant. Empirical studies need to be conducted to ascertain the prevailing
relationship between credit and interest rates and in general, identify the
determinants of non-bank public demand for domestic credit. Such study conducted
by the Bank of England led to the conclusion that control of money through domestic
credit was unlikely to be effective. Gowland (1980) claims that the Bank of England
study is not the only evidence and that all the available evidence indicated
inconclusive results. It is also claimed that a successful credit squeeze could lead to
a shift in the demand for credit function as firms have no alternative to borrowing
when stock are pilling and profits are falling. Another problem is that it is not dear
whether the demand for credit function should depend on real or nominal interest
rate.
l.4.4 11ie lnternntional As,iects

The reforms are intended to encourage the development of open financial market
and promote competition among banks and other financial institutions thereby
making it possible for the Central Bank to use money markets for indirect control of
monetary aggregates and interest rates. These will create conditions under which
domestic and foreign investments will become feasible for a wider range of investors.
Domestic marke ts will become more sensitive to change in foreign financial markets.
This will make it increasingly difficult for the monetary authorities to maintain local
interest rates below the risk-adjusted levels available abroad. The objectives of the
reforms could be achieved if policies that could lead to the minimization of risks
attributable to interest and exchange rates instability are pursued. Apart from the
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promotion of macroeconomic stability, the achievement of socio-political peace and
security of private property will contribute to a significant reduction in the perceived
investment risks which have constituted the basis for sustained capital flight and loss
of confidence in the economy.

II. MODALITIES FOR INDIRECT APPROACH TO MONETARY
AND CREDIT CONTROL IN NIGERIA
Having discussed the principal instrumenls usually used for the indirect approach
to monetary and credit control, the paper now focuses on the modalities for the
day-to-day operations of the instrumenl<; under the new approach by the Central
Bank in order to achieve the desired policy objective. Banks maintain two accounts
with the Central Bank: reserve requirement account (RR) and demand deposit
account (DD). Based on the reported bank deposits and the stipulated ratio of reserve
requirement for the fiscal year, the amount of required reserve (RR) is computed and
transferred into the reserve requirement accounl<; of banks from banks' demand
deposit accounts held in the CBN. Thus, RR varies from time to time depending on
the amount of bank deposits mobilised. RR is not available for banks to use for their
activities and, to this extent, it helps to regulate the ability of banks to create new
credit and therefore influence the level of money supply. The total amount left in
bank's demand deposit accounl<; (DD) is free for banks to use for their foreign
exchange transactions, loans and advances to customers, purchases of treasury
securities at the Open Market Operations of the CBN, and other activities. To the
extent that banks are free to use such reserves for any conceivable transaction they
are called free reserves. It should be stated that there is another component of reserves
called vault cash (VC), which banks hold largely for contingency purposes such as
meeting demand obligations on deposits. Vault cash depends on a bank's experience
with regards to the frequency and magnitude of such demands; it may therefore vary
according to the size of deposits or currency in circulation (CIC). The supply of total
reserves (R) depends on total deposits (D}'. Total deposit is the sum of demand
deposits (DD), savings deposil (SD), time deposit (TD), and interbank deposits (ID).
These factors constitute the sources of bank reserves during a given period.
The demand for bank reserves derives from the need by banks to hold amounts
that enable them to meet the cash reserve requirement, vault cash and free reserves.
Thus, the demand for reserves can be stated as
R = RR+ DD+ VC
............ (1)
In order to estimate the aggregate demand for bank reserves, the CBN projects each
of the three components.
•

This statement neglects shareholders' funds and aa:umulated reserves of banks which are also available to
banks for use.
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For the required reserve, given a deposit of size D, and a stipulated ratio, r,

RR = rD

............ (2)

In the case of vault cash, this could be projected in relation to deposit (D) or currency
in circulation, which is made up of vault cash and currency outside banks. The free
reserves of banks are observed from the Bank's balance sheet
There is an optimal level of money stock which economic agents would like to
hold. The demand for this money stock is estimated from the demand for money
function: This is an essential component of the monetary programme already
mentioned.
The demand for money function, in fact, gives the amount of money that should
be supplied during a period. Jn order to determine the optimal monetary base that
underlies the optimal money supply, the estimated demand for money is related to
the monet.iry base. Using a behavioural relationship, the optimal component of
Bank's frt.>e reserves is determined. The CBN ensures that the targets for its Open
Market Operations are consistent with the level of free reserves observed daily from
its balance sheet.
An essential aspect of the target for the Open Market Opnations is the effect of
some factors on the amount of domestic liquidity that should form the target for Open
Market Operations. These factors include changes in currency outside banks, float,
government deposits, deposits of parastatals with the CBN and other factors.
Variation in currency outside banks could arise through the interaction of the
non-bank public with banks which may affect the level of deposits and therefore the
reserves. Cheques in the pipeline for clearing could, on the aggregate, result in a
positive or negative clearing balance in favour of the banks or the CBN. A negative
clearing balance against the CBN will result in injection of funds into the system while
a positive clearing balance will have the opposite effect. Government parastatals
holding accounts with the CBN could affect the level of domestic liquidity through
the operation of their accounts at the CBN. An increase (decrease) in their deposits
constitutes a withdrawal (injection) from (into) the economy including the banks.
When the movement of such funds is to the Bank it affecl'- the level of bank reserves
directly. Changes in government deposits at the CBN affect the Bank's credit to
government. A positive amount of credit to government represents an injection of
high powered money into the economy. Untimely data availability on some of these
factors has usually compelled estimates of the target for the Open Market Operations
to be made.

•

The CBN has conJucted a number or studies to determine the demand for money function in Nigeria. See,
for example, "The Demand for Mon,:,y Function In Nigeria: An Empirical lnv~-stigation," CBN Research
Department Ocassional Paper No. 3. Also published in f.a,nomic am/ Financirrl Review, Volume 30, No. 1,
March 1992.
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Ill. PROBLEMS ON THE SUCCESSFUL IMPLEMENTATION OF
INDIRECT MONETARY CONTROL IN NIGERIA
From the above discussion it is clear that the the movement to the market oriented
system of indirect monetary control from a rigid regime of direct control will not be
easy. It will involve taking considerable prepari!tory measures to improve the financial environment before the tools are implemented. In reality, it means building a.
financial system which wi11 be more responsive to the needs of lenders and borrowers
as we11 as to monetary control purposes. This will require substantial improvements
in the macroeconomic, legal and regulatory environments. As a developing economy
which has been depressed for too long, it will also require broadening the range and
improving the efficiency of the financial institutions and markets. In the main, the
preparatory activities necessary for the take-off of indirect monetary control will
focus on removing the main obstacles to the new techniques.
Specifically, efforts have to be devoted to the restoration of the appropriate transmission mechanism between the money market and the real sector of the economy;
the design of a competitive market as a medium for mobilizing and channelling
financial resources as well as conducting monetary policy for the control of financial
variables, to their optimal levels to permit the achievement of target rate of growth of
output under non-inflationary condition. Under the rigid, administrativelycontrolled economy prevailing before the introduction of the Structural Adjustment
Programme the identified problems militating against the introduction of the
market-based regime of monetary management are as stated below.
(a)

Government Fiscal Deficit Financing and Excess liquidity

The fiscal deficit constitutes a direct injection to aggregate demand, increasing
p~ures on the general level of prices and the external balance of payments. Also,
reliance on the CBN for the financing of the fiscal deficit of the Federal Government
leads to increases in the monetary base and swells the level of excess liquidity in the
banking system. However, a high level of excess liquidity is inconsistent with the
principle of practical reserves system and the effective use of reserve requirements
and Open Market Operations.
There was therefore the need to rid the system of unwanted liquidity. The most
effective instruments at the disposal of the CBN were the stabilization securities and
the cash reserve requirements. In addition, arrangements needed to be made for the
privatisation of the CBN function of underwriting issues of government debt
instruments as in countries already adopting the new technique. Also, institutional
arrangement that would assist the CBN in a market-oriented management of
domesticliquidity must be put in place to fill a perceived gap in the secondary market
for short-term securities.
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(b)

Harmonization of Fiscal and Monetary Policies

Fiscal deficits of the Federal Government in the recent past has been out of tune with
monetary targets largely because of improper coordination of the fiscal and monetary
programme. Fiscal imbalance has adverse consequences on the monetary base and
the effective use of indirect tools. Fiscal viability during and after the preparatory
period of the monetary programme is thus very important; hence, it was necessary
to set up a machinery to synchronize fiscal and monetary policies on a continuous
basis as well as. formulate the general thrust of the Open Market Operations policy.
(c)

Insolvent Banks

Following the huge size of bad and doubtful debts in banks' portfolio of assets some
banks are currently not solvent enough for the indirect controls. Insolvency undermines inter-bank confidence and also affects the general confidence of the non-bank
public. Confidence in banking is an invaluable asset the lack of which would
undermine competition among participating depository institutions during the
period of indirect monetary and credit control. The problem of ailing banks which is
already being looked into by a joint committee of the CBN and NDIC will thus be
addressed during the preparatory period to ensure that insolvency which affects
confidence is removed.
(d)

Non-Bank Financial Institutions

Since the introduction of the Structural Adjustment programme in 1986, the number
and size of non-bank financial institutions have risen tremendously. These institutions perform some bank-like functions bu tare not currently under the general credit
guidelines of the CBN. If these institutions are not adequately monitored in the new
era, they will be a source of enormous leakages in monetary control. For this reason,
there will be the need to examine the activities of the the non-bank financial institutions. Though this may not be accomplished before implementation, the effort to
assess and monitor the operations of these institutions could still ex.tend into the
implementation stage without precluding the introduction of the new method .
(e)

Inadequate Money Market Activities

Activities on the money market are dominated by Federal Government securities
which are held mainly by the CBN. Brokerage services in the market are controlled
wholly by the banks while there is still no ·adequately developed secondary market
for treasury securities. For this reason, money market activities have remained
narrow even though the volume of securities is very large. Brokerage services need
to be extended to a number of independent brokers beside banks as accredited official
dealers in government securities, as is practised in many countries such as Indonesia,
Malaysia and the U.S. The development of the money market is important for a
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s uccessfu I use of Open Market Operations. Efforts du ring the preparatory period will
be geared towards making the market more active along the Jines indicated. To this
end, non-treasury securities could be introduced into the market.
(f)

Banking Supervision

Effective banking supervision is vital for the success of the new techniques. For this
reason, the supervisory functions of the CBN will need to be strengthened. Hopefully,
the role of NDIC will supplement the supervisory role of the CBN. Banks' reporting
formats wil1 need to be standardized in order to make bank reports and operational
records comparable with one another.
(g)

Statistical Data

A successful manipulation of reserve requirements and Open Market Operations will
require timely and reliable data on the liquidity position of banks and the factors
determining the monetary base. These data are presently available on monthly basis
with some uncomfortable lags. Under the new techniques, data should be readily
available on weekly and even on daily basis. To this end, the system of data
processing, storage and retrieval in the CBN and the banks must be strengthened in
order to make timely intervention of the monetary authorities easy during the
implementation stage.

(h)

Training

The personnel to be involved in the implementation of the new policy need to be
trained. Already some staff of the CBN have undertaken country studies on the use
of indirect monetary control in the Central Bank of Ghana, India, Indonesia and
Malaysia. More of such practical exposure will be undertaken in the near future to
enable staff familiarize themselves with the daily problems of implementation and
design solutions to such problem.

IV. STATUS REPORT ON THE USE OF INDIRECT
MONETARY TOOLS IN NIGERIA
The CBN has made various efforts to tackle many of the above-stated problems in
recognition of the need to provide effective solution to many of them in order to
ensure a successful and smooth shift to the new technique. The Bank has conducted
studies with a view to familiarizing itself with the theoretical and practical details of
the indirect monetary and credit control. As a result of the insight gained, monetary
policy has been structured to facilitate the shift in policy. At the beginning of this
paper mention was made of a few of the structural changes already put in place.
Other changes of particular interest include the introduction of the prudential
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guidelines, the establishment of the Nigeria Deposit Insurance Corporation, requirement of higher capital base for banks, the promulgation of CBN Decree (No. 24) and
the Ban.ks and Other Financial Institutions Decree (No. 2.5) of 1991. What follows is
an elaboration of the efforlc; already made and the problems still outstanding.
Actions Already Taken
Actions already taken relate largely to the liberalization or deregulation of the
financial structure; increasing the regulatory and supervisory powers and operational capacity of the CBN and the establishment of new institutions and arrangements
to facilitate the use of market-based instruments. The actions already taken are
summarized in what follows:
(i)

Deregulation of Interest Rates
In order to create a suitable environment for the use of Open Market
Operations which will constitute the major instrument of monetary control
under the indirect approach to monetary control, bank deposit and lending
rates were deregulated in 1987. The temporary controls placed on some
rates in 1991 were lifted early in 1992.

(ii)

Issue of Treasury Instruments by Auction
An auction-based system for issuing treasury bills and certificates and the
issue of these instruments as bearer bills to enhance transferability have
been introduced with the objective of improving the efficiency of public
debt management and the co nduct of monetary policy; enhancement of
investor interest and participation in the holding of governme nt debt
instruments; promoting greater reliance o n market forces in the
determination of yields on the instruments; and encouraging the
development of the secondary market for government short-term debt
instrument.

(iii)

Simplification of the Procedure For Licensing New Banks
In order to promote competition in the money market, the procedure for
licensing new banks was rationalized and liberalized. Consequ ently, the
number of ban!Jng institutions increased from 50 in 1987 to 119 to date.

(iv)

Promulgation of CBN and BOFI D ecrees
In June 1991, the Federal Government promulgated the CBN Decree (No.
24) and Banks and Other Financial Institutions Decree (No. 25) of 1991.
Among other things, the Decrees gave the CBN a high d egree of autonomy
in the conduct of monetary management, increased -the Bank's regulatory
and supervisory power o ver commercial and merchant banks and
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extended its licensing and supervisory powers to cover new institutions
such as Discount Houses as well as finance houses which were previously
excluded from the Bank's surveillance.
(v)

Issue of Guidelines For Finance Houses and Discount Houses
Following the promulgation of Decree 25, the CBN issued guidelines for
the licensing and operations of finance companies in Nigeria .

(iv)

Enforcement of Stringent Prudential Guidelines
The Prudential Guidelines were introduced in 1990 and are aimed, among
other things, at compelling banks to make adequate provisions for the bad
and doubtful debts underlying the insolvency of some banks. In order to
attenuate the adverse effects of the implementation of the guidelines on
bank..<;' balance sheets, the CBN subsequently allowed banks to write off
accumulated bad and doubtfu I debts over a phased period of four years.

(vii)

Identification of Insolvent Banks
The CBN has embarked on the identification of insolvent banks through
bank examination. One insolvent bank is currently undergoing
restructuring while the remaining ones are allowed self structuring under
the close supervision of the CBN. The CBN is awaiting directives on the
proposals already forwarded to the Federal Government regarding
insolvent banks.

(viii)

Increase in Minimum Paid-up Capital of Banks
Steps have also been taken to strengthen the capital bases of banks. The
minimum paid-up capital of banks has been increased to ~ million in
the case of merchant banks and ~O million in the case of commercial
banks with effect from June, 1992.

(ix)

Licensing of Discount Houses
As a means of developing a secondary market for government debt
instruments with a view to reducing government d epe ndence on the CBN
financing, three discount houses were licensed in 1992. Their primary role
will be to intermediate funds among financial institutions as well as
promote the market for government securities.

(x)

Mopping-up of Banks' Excess Liquidity with Stabilization Securities
Since August 1990, strenuous efforts have been. made by the CBN to
mop-up excess liquidity from the banking system through the issuance of
stabilization securities.
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(xi)

Development of Data Base
The Research Department has embarked on the development of an
economic data bank. Some efforts have been made to improve the quality
and timeliness of financial data. Time series data on financial and economic
variables which will be useful in the projections of some key variables have
been compiled. A machinery for up-dating the series as soon as
information is made available by banks has been worked out.

(xii)

Selective Lifting of Credit Ceilings on Individual Banks
Credit ceilings on individual banks were selectively lifted with effect from
1st September 1992. The lifting of credit ceiling is limited to banks
adjudged healthy by the CBN, and a bank is considered healthy if it meets
CBN guidelines on the following criteria during the previous three
months:
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)
(f)

specified cash reserve requirement;
specified liquidity ratio requirement;
prudential guidelines;
statutory minimum paid-up capital requirement;
capital adequacy ratio, and
sound management.

(xiii)

Creation of Bank Examination Department
Early in 1992, the Field Examination Division of the Banking Supervision
Department was carved out and upgraded into a full fledged Bank
Examination Department in order to enhance the supervisory and
regulatory capacity of the Bank.

(xiv)

Creation of Inter-bank Secondary Market
In July 1991, the CBN issued guidelines on the inter-bank secondary
market in treasury securities with a view to encouraging secondary market
trading at a reduced cost to market participants and discouraging
rediscounting at the CBN.

(xv)

Identification of Healthy Banks
Following the application of the criteria set for banks for the lifting of credit
ceilings, about 80 banks have been certified healthy and exempted from
credit ceilings. The same criteria have been adopted for determining banks
which qualify to participate in the official foreign exchange market.
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Actions Needed to be Taken

The actions needed to be taken which have been elaborated upon in the Framework
and Implementation Schedule approved by CBN Management in August 1992 are
outlined below:
(i)
(ii)
(iii)
(iv)
(v)
(vi)
(vii)

Minimizing Federal Government deficit financing;
Co-ordination and harmonization of monetary and fiscal policies;
Minimizing the use of ways and means advances;
Relieving the CBN of the obligation to underwrite issues of treasury
instruments;
Development of primary and secondary markets in treasury securities;
Restructuring of insolvent banks;
Promotion and development of the money market.

V. PROSPECTS FOR THE SUCCESSFUL IMPLEMENTATION
OF INDIRECT APPROACH TO MONETARY AND
CREDIT CONTROLS
As indicated earlier in this paper, substantial deregulatory measures have been
introduced, resulting in a remarkable achievement of the pre-conditions enumerated
above. The much needed competitive and effective money and short-term securities
markets have sprung up with many operators actively participating in each market.
Interest rates on all financial assets including government instrument<; now reflect
the yields on private financial asset<; of comparable maturities. Currently, the major
instrument of monetary policy is the Open Market Operations supported by the cash
reserve requirements and minimum liquidity ratio. The aspect of designing monetary
programme based on credible targets for growths of output, inflation and net foreign
assets has, for long, been the practice of the monetary autho rities. However, the
problems outstanding are still sufficiently formidable to reduce the pace of the
forward match and undo the gains already achieved.
V.I

Government Fiscal Deficit

The most important problem of the shift to the indirect approach to monetary
management in Nigeria is the persistence of government fiscal deficit, financed by
the banking system, especially the Central Bank. The enormity of the problem derives
from the magnitude of the deficit, il<; persistence and the mode of financing. In recent
years, deficit financing has constituted the greatest threat to monetary policy, reducing the effectiveness of policy instruments. Consequently, inflationary pressures have
persisted; exchange rate depreciation in all segment<; of the foreign exchange market
has been rapid while the current account of the balance of payments has recorded
unsteady performances, fluctuating between small surplus and large deficitc;.
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The deficit has also complicated the management of the interest rates which are
vita.I indicators of performance of policy under the indirect approach to monetary
control. Efforts to minimize the growth of the domestic liquidity arising from the
monetary effects of the deficits through the issuance of stabilization securities have
resulted in an upsurge of inter-bank rates. The rates which in normal circumstances
should be the lowest are the highest. The insatiable demand of banks for foreign
exchange despite the adoption of measures to reduce domestic liquidity has been
traceable to the monetary impact of the fiscal deficit. The fiscal deficit has been
responsible for excessive growths in monetary and financial variables, exacerbating
the distortions in the system. For instance, aggregate credit, propelled by excessive
credit to the Federal Government, surpassed optimal targets in recent consecutive
years, creating pressures for domestic and external sectors of the economy. Monetary
base and the net domestic assets of the CBN also grew excessively, reflecting largely
the Bank's credit to the Federal Government and threatening explosion in the money
stock. It is generally believed that if the problems of fiscal deficit and it<; current mode
of financing are removed from the economic problems challenging monetary policy
today the country will witness greater macroeconomic stability reflected in the
resumption of stable growth as well as reduced unemployment and inflation.
The prospect for improved performance of monetary policy under the regime of
indirect approach depends, inextricably, on the extent of reduction in fiscal deficit
financing and the avoidance of reliance on the financial resources of the banking
system for the financing of the deficit. The probability of reducing the deficit depends
on the ability of government to generate additional revenue and rationalise its
recurrent expenditures. Effort<; to raise revenue through reduction of petrol subsidy
have met with political and social constraints. Government has also introduced the
value added tax (VAT) with a view to improving revenue out-turn. With regards to
expenditures, government has taken steps to privatize some parastatals with a view
to eliminating the grants to these agencies. It is hoped that the intensification of these
measures and the adoption of credible strategy towards removing the socio-political
constraints will increase the prospects of viability of government finances and
eventually eliminate unsustainable budgeting and financing
The achievement of the above mentioned improvements will no doubt promote
the viability of government, thereby reducing or eliminating government reliance on
the ba.nking system's financial resources as it is in many countries adopting indirect
approach to monetary and credit control. Such countries have either learnt from the
adverse experiences of others or themselves have witnessed the dangers in this
method of macroeconomic management.
Only a few decades ago a serious debate concerning the potency of monetary
policy was raging among economists. Many then believed that money was irrelevant
and did not require special attention. Concerning interest rates, they thought that
what should be done was to keep it a~ low as possible by pursuing a policy of cheap
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money so as to keep down the cost of public debt and permit government to borrow
as much as it would. In fact, several governments were misguided into this approach
to economic management. However, experience over the years has proved the fallacy
inherent in such economic policies. Nowadays, governments of many countries,
including those in developed countries, have learnt from the problems created by
unstable monetary growth, due especially to the financing of government fiscal
deficit from the banking system's resources. The firm desire of such governments to
promote macroeconomic stability and engender growths of investment and
employment has led them to desist from pursuing policies which could lead to
unstable expansion in money. There is no doubt that the forces that brought about
the improvement in other countries will also bring a change in our own case.
V.2 Co-ordination of Monetary and Fiscal Policies
The fact that monetary policy cannot succeed at achieving programme target without
the support of fiscal authorities was emphasized in Part I of this paper. The co-ordination is necessary even at the preparatory stage of the programme. The target rates
of growths of output and general level of prices as well as the expected balance of
payments for the programme period should be inputs to the fiscal budget preparation. When the appropriate stance of monetary policy should be restrictive, the fiscal
authorities have to lend support by not adopting expansionary policies. In the
Nigerian situation where financing of fiscal deficit could be obtained from the
banking system, the prospect of the indirect approach to monetary control in achieving target depends largely on co-ordination between the fiscal and monetary
authorities particularly because the response of the economy to excessive monetary
expansion is more pronounced and noticeable under the market oriented approach
than under the credit ceiling. Even if fiscal deficit is financed outside the banking
system in the domestic economy, movements in interest rates should be taken into
account. Issue of bonds usually require higher rates to stimulate the response of the
market. This may lead to a general rise in the structure of interest rates and the
crowding out of private sector investments.
Fostering Confidence in the Financial System
The prospect of the new monetary strategy could be significantly enhanced by
intensified efforts to sanitise the banking system with a view to promoting the
soundness and solvency of banks . To this end, the monetary authorities should
increase the tempo of enforcement of regulations designed to raise the confidence of
economic agents, the patronage of which s ustain the system. There is also the need
to find solution to such sectoral problems as the mushrooming of finance houses and
mortgage institutions whose operations have conflicted with that of banking services
in a number of activities. The apparent lack of order in the operations of these
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institutions need to be checked. Efforts need to be devoted to ensure tbe proper
classification of institutions in the financial sector. Institutions meant for long-term
finance such as merchant banks should not operate like commercial or retail bankers
in order to foreclose the chances of mismatch of funds, i.e. using short-term funds for
long-term financing and thereby increasing the risk of insolvency. The strengthening
of the regulatory institutions through enhanced powers to deal with various
categories of financial institutions as contained in CBN Decree No. 24 of 1991 and
BOFI Decree No. 25 of 1991 has contributed significantly to the resolution of many
problems in the system. This has also enhanced the prospects of the new market
oriented approach.
Discipline

Finally, it should be emphasized that indirect approach to monetary control cannot
work without discipline on the part of both government and financial institutions.
This aspect of fiscal restraint has been mentioned but it cannot be over-emphasized.
In all the countries that have successfully adopted the market oriented techniques
the finance of fiscal deficit is privatized and the involvement of the banking system's
financial resources in the financing of government deficit is limited to what is
sustainable. The magnitude of this sustainable financing is determined by the system
itself. It is the market that determines the overall size of domestic financing of the
fiscal deficit in those countries we are trying to copy. This is why indirect monetary
and credit control has achieved the much needed macroeconomic stability required
for growth in the countries.
With regard to the banks, discipline is required in prompt rendering of accurate
returns and observance of the monetary policy guidelines which are based on the
prevailing developments in the relevant indicators. Probity, forthrightness, and
accountability are also required from the directors and staff of banks. Banks should
also institute a system of self regulation alongside the official efforts. This will
strengthen the current efforts designed to stimulate the confidence of the non-bank
public in the financial system. The prospects of indirect approach to monetary and
credit control in achieving output, inflation and exchange rate targets depend on the
degree of discipline exercised by government and banks. The new technique of
monetary management can only create a suitable environment for investment and
growth if all sectors of the economy exercise a high degree of discipline.
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